For my son Nathan’s school assignment to interview a veteran, he chose my uncle, Major General Robert A. Ballard.
My brother John recently found an audio recording of an interview Uncle Robert did with my Dad before Robert died in 1992. It was very interesting talking about which generals he liked (Patton) and ones he did not like.
On January 5, 1945, at the Battle Bastogne One casualty was Colonel Ewell, who was badly wounded and relinquished command to LTC Robert Ballard, who had commanded 2nd Battalion from the beginning. Bob Ballard was a quiet Floridian who was not a professional soldier like Johnson or Ewell, but a fine officer who had learned how to command quietly and effectively while winning the admiration and respect of his men. Ballard continued in command of the 501st until the end of World War II.” The 501st received its second Presidential Citation for the defense of Bastogne Below is an excerpt of DDay which mentions Uncle Robert 8 times. It is from http://homeusers.brutele.be/sgteagle/welcometothealliedairborneheadquarters_screamingeagles.htm The completion of the division's defensive line in the south was the mission of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 501st Parachute Infantry (Colonel Johnson). To carry it out the 1st Battalion was ordered to seize the lock on the Douve River at la Barquette, and the 2d Battalion (Lt. Col. Robert A. Ballard) to blow the Douve River bridges on the main road from St. Come-du-Mont to Carentan . The regiment was also ordered to take St. Come-du-Mont, if possible, and to destroy the railroad bridge to the west. Of these objectives, the la Barquette lock had assumed a special importance in the eyes of the planners. The lock, located due north of Carentan, controls the water level of the Douve River to the west as far as the confluence of the Merderet. When the lock is opened the high tide floods the river channel and spreads gradually over the whole low marshy area between St. Côme-du-Mont and Carentan. Ultimately, through opening and closing the lock according to the tide level, the valleys of the Douve and Merderet can be turned into a shallow lake as far north as le Ham and as far west as St. Sauveur-le Vicomte. East of the lock the tide flow is kept in the river channel by flood banks from six to eight feet high. During the years when the RAF had this area under observation, inundations were observed periodically, extending in a large westward area between the ridges of high ground around St. Côme-du-Mont and the solid lower ground south and west of Carentan. Possession of the lock therefore meant control of a potentially valuable natural barrier to possible German counterattack against the south flank of the beachhead. Furthermore, if seizure of the lock were coupled with destruction of the bridges north of Carentan on the only good route across the swamps, the task of safeguarding the left flank of VII Corps would be greatly facilitated. Actually the tactical value of the lock was exaggerated. The flooding was unusually slight and erratic. The area behind the lock was flooded and drained so slowly that the inundation could not be used as a flexible defense measure.Securing of this objective came close to failure at the outset, primarily because of a bad drop. The 501st Parachute Infantry, according to the original plan, was to drop between Vierville and Houesville, astride the two highways north of Carentan. A few days before D Day Drop Zone D was shifted southeastward to the area Anoville-au-Plain-Bse. Addeville at the request of Colonel Johnson, who wished to land closer to his objectives, the la Barquette lock and bridges north of Carentan. A secondary consideration which also favored this change was the fact that anti-airborne landing obstacles were appearing in the fields of the original drop zone. This brought the drop zone considerably nearer the lower Douve, and when the regiment actually made the drop, the first plane serial, carrying the 1st Battalion and regimental headquarters, was badly scattered, some of its sticks landing deep in enemy territory south of Carentan. Many others landed in the swampy bottom lands to the west. The 1st Battalion's command personnel was particularly hard hit. The commanding officer was killed, his executive officer was apparently captured, and all other company commanders and staff were also missing initially. In part, at least, the day was saved by an accident. A large percentage of planes of the 1st and 2d Battalions' serials had unloaded too soon. As the jump signal flashed in Colonel Johnson's plane, a bundle became wedged in the door. The delay caused by this prevented a premature unloading and brought Colonel Johnson and his men squarely down on Drop Zone D. Moving south, Colonel Johnson collected some 150 men of miscellaneous units. At the trail junction just north of the lock, he verified his position and sent fifty men to take the objective, while the remainder of the force deployed defensively in place. The assault reached the lock in one dash, crossed it, and dug in on the soft ground of the far bank before the enemy could bring the area under shell fire. Even then the Germans made no attempt to press in on the bridgehead. Colonel Johnson thought that with a little additional strength he could proceed with the mission of blowing the bridges, which were only 2,000 yard up the river. But the patrols sent out in that direction drew fire with every movement. Satisfied that the lock situation was in hand, that his own position on this low-lying hollow was not favorable, and that he would need a stronger force for the task of destroying the Douve bridges, Colonel Johnson decided to move north and make contact with elements of the regiment at Bse. Addeville, 1,000 yards to the northwest. Patrols had reported that Maj. R. J. Allen, regimental S-3, had a sizeable force there.Leaving the defense at the lock, Colonel Johnson took about fifty men to Bse. Addeville, hoping to gather sufficient strength to proceed against St. Come-du-Mont. At 0900, the force arrived at Bse. Addeville. Near this town Major Allen had gathered a hundred men from several units, but these were already engaged with the enemy to the north and west. Without knowledge of other units in the division, Colonel Johnson was uncertain as to how best to employ his small forces. His decision was finally crystallized by a radio broadcast of the BBC from London . It was the noon news bulletin and brought word that the invasion “is going according to plan and the operations of the American airborne divisions are meeting with success.” This news that the battle was going well elsewhere encouraged Colonel Johnson to proceed with the regimental mission. A small force was to be left at Bse. Addeville, with the bulk of his troops returning to la Barquette to move on the bridges. At this point Colonel Johnson learned that 250 men of the 2d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry (Colonel Ballard), who had not been heard from previously, were heavily engaged at les Droueries, 1,000 yards to the northwest. Colonel Johnson was intent on the mission to the south and wanted Colonel Ballard's force to join him. But the enemy was between Colonel Ballard's force and that of Colonel Johnson's, and neither Major Allen's nor Colonel Ballard's units could move to join forces. Leaving fifty men at Bse. Addeville under Major Allen, Colonel Johnson took command of the remainder of the force and moved out at about 1330. At the la Barquette position the force was met by intense enemy artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire, coming partly from east of Carentan and partly from the direction of St. Come-du-Mont. Among the men Major Allen had collected was Lieutenant Farrell, the naval shore fire control officer. He was in radio contact with the fleet and called the Quincy . Within a few minutes the first 8-inch salvo was delivered. Despite the difficulties, Lieutenant Farrell's adjustments brought a remarkably accurate concentration on enemy positions around St. Côme-du- Mont, and their mortar fire slackened immediately. Following this the naval fire was shifted to support the 2d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry, at les Droueries. With enemy fire partially neutralized in the vicinity of la Barquette, Colonel Johnson resumed his efforts to take the Douve bridges. A new patrol, however, again reported progress to the west impossible because of heavy enemy fire. Colonel Johnson therefore ordered the extension of the defense at the lock east and west, pushing as close to the highway as possible. The bridgehead was built up to 100 yards in depth south of the lock. As protection against attack from the north, the position was expanded about 200 yards east and west and reinforced with automatic weapons. The 250 men with Colonel Johnson were augmented at 2000 by 30 brought down by Major Allen from Bse. Addeville. About 20 of the defenders were sent out during the night on patrols in an unavailing effort to find the headquarters of the division and of the 506th Parachute Infantry. Contact with Captain Shettle's men of the 506th at le Port was maintained. The other patrols were lost. By the end of D Day Colonel Johnson's miscellaneous force had accomplished only a part of the regimental mission—the part originally assigned to the 1st Battalion. The 2d Battalion, becoming involved with the enemy in the vicinity of St. Côme-du-Mont shortly after the drop, was never able to move south to deal with the Carentan bridges on Colonel Johnson's right flank. Colonel Ballard (2d Battalion) had assembled, between Angoville-au-Plain and les Droueries, small groups from each of his three rifle companies and his battalion staff. He planned to move at once on St. Côme-du-Mont, which lay astride his main route to the Douve bridges. Prior G-2 information had indicated that the town was held by only one enemy platoon. It soon became apparent, however, that there were enemy forces of some strength at les Droueries between Colonel Ballard and his objective. Orders were consequently issued for the attack on les Droueries. At 0530 two "companies," each with about thirty men, moved out abreast to seize two crossroads on the two trails from Angoville-au-Plain southwest. The third company followed in support. The enemy frustrated the frontal attack with small arms and mortars but a new group of men, mainly from the 506th Parachute Infantry, arrived and succeeded in flanking the enemy on the right. Some progress had been made, although the Germans had not been beaten back, when Colonel Ballard received orders from Colonel Johnson to join him at la Barquette. The battalion, therefore, disengaged as soon as it could and returned to Angoville-au- Plain about noon, planning to move to la Barquette across the swamps south of Angoville-au-Plain. However, the area was covered by enemy fire and was soon found impassable, and the battalion moved instead along the west edge toward Bse. Addeville, which Major Allen had just reported he was about to vacate in order to join Colonel Johnson. The 2d Battalion had moved only about 400 yards when it was stopped by heavy fire from the same enemy force which had contested the morning attack on les Droueries. There the battalion remained for the night, in close contact with the enemy. The 501st Parachute Infantry had secured the lock at la Barquette, but strong enemy resistance had prevented the capture of St. Come-du-Mont as well as the destruction of the railroad and highway bridges north of Carentan.While the battle for the causeways raged, the 327th GIR, reinforced by 1/401 had crossed south of Carentan and secured the eastern exits from the town. That accomplished, the 327th began their assault on Carentan from the east. Carentan was surrounded and being attacked from two sides but the Germans held. The attacking forces were ordered to pull back to allow a massive artillery and naval gunfire bombardment of Carentan to begin. At dawn of June 12, the barrage lifted and the assault began anew. 1/506 and 2/506 attacked from the west and the 501st and 327th attacked from the east and north. Quick advances were made and Carentan was seized.
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